Stop Seven: Hiroshima
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first of two atomic bomb in Japan; the first, code-named “Little Boy,” was dropped on Hiroshima, followed three days later by “Fat Man,” on the city of Nagasaki. American President Harry Truman believed the bombs were necessary to end the war against a Japanese aggressor who refused, although defeated, to surrender. While the aftermath of the bombings had clear ramifications for the world of war, the technological development of weapons of mass destruction, and the future of Japan, the bombings also left their political mark on the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world, particularly with respect to the U.S.S.R. While Truman made it known to Stalin at the Potsdam Conference that the United States possessed a new and powerful weapon of war, Truman did not warn Stalin or inform Stalin of its intended use.
Primary Source: Wallace, Henry. Letter to Harry S. Truman. 23 July 1946. History Matters George Manson University. Web. <historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6906> 29 Apr 2015.
Henry Wallace to President Truman, July 1946:
“American [military] actions since [the end of World War Two] …make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win a war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had ten-thousand-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coast lines and we did not?”
Secondary Source: Holloway, David. Interview. PBS: Race for the Superbomb, WGBH Educational Foundation: 1999. Web transcript. <www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/ filmmore/reference/interview/holloway05.html> 26 Apr 2015.
Q: So the U.S. nuclear monopoly was really seen as aimed against the Soviet Union?
DH: Oh, yes, I think Stalin and the leadership basically saw [the atomic bombing of] Hiroshima as directed against the Soviet Union. They thought, believed that the war with Japan would be over quickly. Of course, the Soviet Union was moving troops to the Far East in order to enter the war with Japan. Stalin was committed to doing that; he had wanted to do that in order to secure concessions and strengthen the Soviet strategic position in the Far East...
So [bombing Hiroshima] was seen as something unnecessary because...it was clear that Japan would be defeated. And secondly, it was seen as a kind of anti-Soviet, a kind of sly, or cunning anti-Soviet political move. So yes, it was seen very much as directed against the Soviet Union and directed against the Soviet Union, not only in order to deprive the Soviet Union of gains in the Far East, but generally to intimidate the Soviet Union. You know, look what we have. We have this bomb which is so powerful that with one detonation, we can destroy a city. And you better behave yourselves. You better be more tractable, more amenable in the dealing with the post-war settlement in Europe. And I think that's very much how Stalin interpreted Hiroshima.
Q: So how did Stalin respond to the bombing of Hiroshima?
DH: His response was to show that he would not give in to pressure. It was not to become more amenable and more tractable. In fact, if anything, it was to show that the Soviet Union would not be intimidated. And how would you show that? You would show it by being difficult, or if you would like, even more difficult than before. Even less willing to reach agreements on Western terms. So that if anything, I think the political effect of Hiroshima was to reinforce a sense in Stalin's mind of the need to be very tough-minded in dealing with the West. Because any concession would be taken as a sign of weakness. A sign that atomic diplomacy was working and I think his reading was, if you make one concession, then they ask for more concessions, so you just have to be very tough, that was the nature of the game.
Analysis Questions:
Primary Source: Wallace, Henry. Letter to Harry S. Truman. 23 July 1946. History Matters George Manson University. Web. <historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6906> 29 Apr 2015.
Henry Wallace to President Truman, July 1946:
“American [military] actions since [the end of World War Two] …make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win a war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had ten-thousand-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coast lines and we did not?”
Secondary Source: Holloway, David. Interview. PBS: Race for the Superbomb, WGBH Educational Foundation: 1999. Web transcript. <www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/ filmmore/reference/interview/holloway05.html> 26 Apr 2015.
Q: So the U.S. nuclear monopoly was really seen as aimed against the Soviet Union?
DH: Oh, yes, I think Stalin and the leadership basically saw [the atomic bombing of] Hiroshima as directed against the Soviet Union. They thought, believed that the war with Japan would be over quickly. Of course, the Soviet Union was moving troops to the Far East in order to enter the war with Japan. Stalin was committed to doing that; he had wanted to do that in order to secure concessions and strengthen the Soviet strategic position in the Far East...
So [bombing Hiroshima] was seen as something unnecessary because...it was clear that Japan would be defeated. And secondly, it was seen as a kind of anti-Soviet, a kind of sly, or cunning anti-Soviet political move. So yes, it was seen very much as directed against the Soviet Union and directed against the Soviet Union, not only in order to deprive the Soviet Union of gains in the Far East, but generally to intimidate the Soviet Union. You know, look what we have. We have this bomb which is so powerful that with one detonation, we can destroy a city. And you better behave yourselves. You better be more tractable, more amenable in the dealing with the post-war settlement in Europe. And I think that's very much how Stalin interpreted Hiroshima.
Q: So how did Stalin respond to the bombing of Hiroshima?
DH: His response was to show that he would not give in to pressure. It was not to become more amenable and more tractable. In fact, if anything, it was to show that the Soviet Union would not be intimidated. And how would you show that? You would show it by being difficult, or if you would like, even more difficult than before. Even less willing to reach agreements on Western terms. So that if anything, I think the political effect of Hiroshima was to reinforce a sense in Stalin's mind of the need to be very tough-minded in dealing with the West. Because any concession would be taken as a sign of weakness. A sign that atomic diplomacy was working and I think his reading was, if you make one concession, then they ask for more concessions, so you just have to be very tough, that was the nature of the game.
Analysis Questions:
- How might the growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union have contributed to Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb in Japan?
- How did the USSR interpret American use of the atomic bomb?
- How did the atomic bomb contribute to and reinforce the pre-existing tensions between the two nations?