Stop Nine: Kiev
In 1946, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan was asked to analyze Soviet behavior. Policymakers in Washington were confused as to why the Soviets were not supporting the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Additionally, politicians were disturbed by the rhetoric and worldview espoused in Stalin’s recent election speech. In response, Kennan wrote the Long Telegram, explaining his interpretation and advice for future American-Soviet relations.
Primary Source: Kennan, George F. “Telegram to James F. Byrnes,” 22 Feb. 1946. US Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol 4 (Washington, DC: GPO 1944) 988-990. Accessed on the web. Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum <www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/ coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf> 26 Apr 2015.
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
THE CHARGE IN THE SOVIET UNION (KENNAN) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3:52 p.m.]
Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification.
Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine are as Follows:
(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.
(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.
(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world…
(e) Conflicts between capitalist states nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, and ideologically faithful to its present brilliant leadership.
(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes
What can we conclude from this about Soviet policy? [written from the Soviet perspective]
(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.
(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.
(c) [Sympathetic] elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart the problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
Analysis Questions:
Primary Source: Kennan, George F. “Telegram to James F. Byrnes,” 22 Feb. 1946. US Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol 4 (Washington, DC: GPO 1944) 988-990. Accessed on the web. Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum <www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/ coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf> 26 Apr 2015.
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
THE CHARGE IN THE SOVIET UNION (KENNAN) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3:52 p.m.]
Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification.
Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine are as Follows:
(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.
(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.
(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world…
(e) Conflicts between capitalist states nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, and ideologically faithful to its present brilliant leadership.
(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes
- certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and
- certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.
What can we conclude from this about Soviet policy? [written from the Soviet perspective]
(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.
(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.
(c) [Sympathetic] elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart the problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
- We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown.
- Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
- We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
- Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
Analysis Questions:
- In the section titled, Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, Kennan writes from the Soviet perspective to illustrate the Soviet worldview. According to Kennan, how do the Soviets see and understand the outside world?
- Given his characterization of the Soviet outlook, what does Kennan think the Soviets are going to do? What will be the Soviet policy towards the outside world?
- In Kennan’s policy recommendations to the United States, what does he argue the U.S. should do to counteract the U.S.S.R.?