Stop Eighteen: Offices of Izestiva, Petrograd
Primary Source: "The American Bludgeon in the Solution of Market Problems." Izvestiya, November 3, 1949. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Web. 26 Apr 2015 <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/images/ russiancartoon.jpg>.
Secondary Source: Parrish, Scott and Mikhail Narinsky. “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC (1994) p13-14. Accessed on the web. <www.wilsoncenter.org/ sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf> 29 Apr 2015.
Initial Soviet reaction to the speech itself seems to have been cautious, and tinged with suspicion, but far from categorical. Marshall’s speech was sufficiently ambiguous to make its interpretation difficult. Was this new American initiative a threat or an opportunity? Reflecting this uncertainty, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai V. Novikov, cabled Moscow on June 9 that although Marshall had relied on vague generalities in his speech, the U.S. initiative appeared to lend support to the “Monnet Plan,” the economic reconstruction plan put forward earlier in France. In his analysis, based on a close reading of the American press, Novikov suggested that the purpose of Marshall’s speech was to inspire the British to join the French in creating an economic plan for European recovery. But this plan would have more than simply economic objectives. In the American proposal, Novikov concluded, “the outlines of a Western European bloc directed against us [the USSR] are patently visible. The State Department is now working furiously on this plan.” The first analysis Molotov and Stalin received from their embassy in Washington almost certainly increased their suspicions of American intent.
To the extent that one can judge from available documentation, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was also cautious in his initial assessment, but not as not so pessimistic as his ambassador. The original translation of Marshall’s speech into Russian that Molotov read is heavily underlined, hinting at the interpretation he placed on it. First, Molotov underlined the sections that emphasized the seriousness of the economic situation in Europe. He heavily underlined not only the sentence: “Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world,” but also later Marshall’s remark that “It should be clear to everyone what effects this could have on the economy of the United States.” Molotov also underlined the conclusion: “the United States must do everything within its power so as to assist in the return of normal economic conditions in the world.”
Secondly, as one would expect from the suspicious Molotov, he underlined the following two sentences: “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos,” as well as the phrase, “governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.” Molotov then underlined and noted in the margin three main points of the plan’s structure that Marshall alluded to in the closing paragraphs of his speech: 1) that the European countries must come to an agreement about their economic requirements; 2) that the initiative must come from the Europeans themselves; and 3) that the American role should be limited to aid and support of such an economic program.
Initial Soviet reaction to the speech itself seems to have been cautious, and tinged with suspicion, but far from categorical. Marshall’s speech was sufficiently ambiguous to make its interpretation difficult. Was this new American initiative a threat or an opportunity? Reflecting this uncertainty, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai V. Novikov, cabled Moscow on June 9 that although Marshall had relied on vague generalities in his speech, the U.S. initiative appeared to lend support to the “Monnet Plan,” the economic reconstruction plan put forward earlier in France. In his analysis, based on a close reading of the American press, Novikov suggested that the purpose of Marshall’s speech was to inspire the British to join the French in creating an economic plan for European recovery. But this plan would have more than simply economic objectives. In the American proposal, Novikov concluded, “the outlines of a Western European bloc directed against us [the USSR] are patently visible. The State Department is now working furiously on this plan.” The first analysis Molotov and Stalin received from their embassy in Washington almost certainly increased their suspicions of American intent.
To the extent that one can judge from available documentation, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was also cautious in his initial assessment, but not as not so pessimistic as his ambassador. The original translation of Marshall’s speech into Russian that Molotov read is heavily underlined, hinting at the interpretation he placed on it. First, Molotov underlined the sections that emphasized the seriousness of the economic situation in Europe. He heavily underlined not only the sentence: “Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world,” but also later Marshall’s remark that “It should be clear to everyone what effects this could have on the economy of the United States.” Molotov also underlined the conclusion: “the United States must do everything within its power so as to assist in the return of normal economic conditions in the world.”
Secondly, as one would expect from the suspicious Molotov, he underlined the following two sentences: “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos,” as well as the phrase, “governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.” Molotov then underlined and noted in the margin three main points of the plan’s structure that Marshall alluded to in the closing paragraphs of his speech: 1) that the European countries must come to an agreement about their economic requirements; 2) that the initiative must come from the Europeans themselves; and 3) that the American role should be limited to aid and support of such an economic program.